The potential power of experience in communications of expert consensus levels by Harris, A.J.L. et al.
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Harris, A.J.L. and Sildmäe, O. and Speekenbrink, M. and Hahn, Ulrike (2018)
The potential power of experience in communications of expert consensus
levels. Journal of Risk Research 22 (5), pp. 593-609. ISSN 1366-9877.
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/28813/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
Experiencing consensus communications  1 
 
The potential power of experience in communications of expert 
consensus levels 
 
Adam J. L. Harrisa*, Oliver Sildmäe a, Maarten Speekenbrinka, and Ulrike 
Hahnb 
aDept. of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK; bDept. of 
Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London, UK. 
 
*Adam J. L. Harris, Dept. of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 
Bedford Way, London, UK, WC1H 0AP. Email: adam.harris@ucl.ac.uk 
Oliver Sildmäe, Dept. of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 
Bedford Way, London, UK, WC1H 0AP. Email: oliver.sildmae@gmail.com 
Ulrike Hahn, Dept. of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London, 
UK. Email: u.hahn@bbk.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Word count: 8,022  (excluding abstract and figure captions) 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiencing consensus communications  2 
 
The potential power of experience in communications of expert 
consensus levels 
Understanding the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change has 
been dubbed a ‘gateway belief’ to engaging people in sustainable behaviour. We 
consider the question of how the impact of a consensus communication can be 
maximised. Firstly, the credibility of the communicator should be maximised. 
One way of achieving this is to present the opinions of a sample of scientists 
directly to individuals. The decision making literature suggests that such a 
technique will confer an additional advantage over standard descriptions of 
consensus (e.g., “97% of scientists agree”). In decision making research, low 
probabilities tend to be overweighted when probabilities are described, but 
underweighted when probability information is experienced. Consequently, 
statements of high consensus may lead to an overweighting of the dissensus, a 
phenomenon that may be reversed were the consensus to be ‘experienced.’  We 
obtain some positive support for our proposal that consensus is best 
‘experienced’ in one of two experiments. We suggest that the lack of stronger 
positive support could relate to ceiling effects for the topics studied and propose 
that investigation of effective methods for ‘experiencing’ the consensus is a 
fruitful area for future research. 
 
Keywords: source credibility; decisions from experience; climate change; 
testimony 
  
Experiencing consensus communications  3 
 
‘97% of climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming’ 
‘Nine out of ten economists say Brexit will damage economy’ 
‘84% of medical scientists agree that regular aerobic exercise lowers diastolic 
blood pressure’ (Cook et al., 2013; Green, 2016; Whelton, Chin, Xin, & He, 
2002). 
 
The statements above represent a fundamental element of the scientific method, that of 
consensus building. As an incremental, cumulative practice, an emergent consensus 
becomes our best possible estimate of the true state of the world. Subsequently, 
decisions, policies, engineering breakthroughs,…, can all be made relative to this 
scientific knowledge. How, though, should this consensus best be communicated to the 
public and policy makers to ensure maximum effectiveness? 
Expert consensus is relevant across almost any domain which requires specialist 
knowledge. Some recent research has, however, specifically highlighted the role of 
scientific consensus in relation to the topic of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). As 
a universal global concern, such a focus is understandable. Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-
Renouf and Leiserowitz (2011; see also, McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013; van der 
Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015) demonstrated, statistically, that 
correct perceptions of high levels of expert consensus about the reality of ACC 
predicted greater support for climate change mitigation policies through increasing 
beliefs that ACC is occurring. Subsequently, Lewandowsky, Gignac and Vaughan 
(2013; see also van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2014) demonstrated 
this latter result experimentally. Specifically, participants informed that “97 out of 100 
climate experts agree that global warming is a consequence of the burning of fossil 
fuels” (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013, p. 403), subsequently reported higher 
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estimates of the scientific consensus and a higher belief in the link between human CO2 
emissions and climate change. Thus, highlighting the level of scientific consensus has 
been suggested as an approach to increase support for climate mitigation policies, being 
tagged a ‘gateway belief’ for the subsequent support of such actions (e.g., van der 
Linden et al., 2015).  
The efficacy of consensus communications in affecting greater support for 
sustainable policies has not, however, gone unquestioned (see e.g., Cook, 2016; Cook & 
Jacobs, 2014, for reviews). As an example, Kahan (2015) argued that from 2003 to 
2013, public option had not updated in favour of believing in ACC, despite the release 
of six studies quantifying high levels of scientific consensus in that time period, plus the 
release of ‘An Inconvenient Truth.’ Consequently, Kahan argues, lab-based 
demonstrations of the efficacy of consensus messaging must not be ecologically valid. 
This debate is not of central concern to the current manuscript, though we note that 
since 2010 there is evidence that public belief in ACC has increased (e.g., Gallup, 2017; 
Hamilton, 2016; the start of this pattern is also noticeable in Kahan’s, 2015, Figure 8). 
What is of central concern to the current manuscript is that, in addition to demonstrating 
the effectiveness of messages about the scientific consensus, laboratory studies have 
also demonstrated that there is still room for improvement. Specifically, whilst 
estimated levels of scientific consensus increased an impressive 21%, from 67% to 
88%, following receipt of the consensus message in Lewandowsky, Gignac, and 
Vaughan (2013), this ‘posterior’ degree of belief still remained some way short of the 
communicated figure of 97% (see Bolsen, Leeper, & Shapiro, 2014, for even more 
mixed results).  
The current paper draws insights from formal work on source credibility, and 
descriptive research in human decision making to suggest methods for improving the 
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effectiveness of the communication of expert consensus. Finally, we present two 
experiments as an initial test of the potential efficacy of these methods. 
Source credibility 
 The statements presented at the top of this article represent pieces of testimony. 
That is, someone is stating that this proportion of experts agree on this fact. Arguably, 
most of what we believe we know stems from the testimony of others. As an example, 
most people’s belief that North America is west of Europe is based on a map that 
another individual has drawn. Even our experience of travelling by plane provides little 
direct evidence as to the directional relationship between the continents. The current 
authors’ (firm) belief that America does lie west of Europe is based primarily on a level 
of trust in map makers (and geography teachers).  
As the example above suggests, source credibility is a key factor underlying how 
persuasive a piece of testimony should be (e.g., Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Friedman, 
1987; Schum, 1981). Moreover, Hahn, Harris and Corner (2009; see also Harris & 
Hahn, 2009; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2016) have demonstrated that people can 
incorporate considerations of source credibility into their evaluation of a 
communication in a normatively appropriate manner. It is thus important to give source 
credibility due attention in consensus communications. 
One way in which a source might be unreliable is if they are deliberately 
deceitful. Perceptions of deceitfulness are at the heart of conspiracy claims such as ‘the 
moon landings were faked to demonstrate the United States’ superiority over the 
USSR’.  The potential for deceit is an issue of genuine concern in an evaluation of 
testimony. However, considerations of source credibility are not only integral in 
instances of wilful deceit. A lack of competence should also influence the 
persuasiveness of a piece of testimony. As an extreme example, if your (honest – i.e., 
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there is no misdirection involved) friend flips a coin under a cup and says “I think it’s 
heads”, you should not update your belief that the coin under the cup has landed on 
heads. Your friend in this instance has no privileged information – they are as likely to 
say “heads” if the coin has come up heads as if it has come up tails. Subsequently, their 
‘testimony’ is non-diagnostic of the true state of the world. Less extreme examples are 
ubiquitous. As one example, multiple factors are known to impact the accuracy of 
eyewitness testimony, even where the eyewitness has no motivation to provide a biased 
testimony (for a review see Wells & Olson, 2003). The two components to source 
credibility (the more malevolent deceit and the less malevolent paucity of knowledge) 
have been termed, variously: veracity and sensitivity (Schum, 1981, 19941); 
trustworthiness and expertise (Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 2012; Harris et al., 2016; 
Walton, 2008); helpfulness and knowledgeability (Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 
2012). 
Concepts of source credibility are central to the evaluation of a communication 
of scientific consensus at two levels. The first level is the individual scientists 
themselves. There is a great difference in the convincingness of the agreement of 84% 
of medical scientists if they are known to be the ‘crackpots’ (low in trustworthiness and 
expertise), whereas the 16% who disagree with the statement are the respectable 
scientists high in both trustworthiness and expertise. Source credibility also becomes a 
relevant concept wherever an individual is not experiencing the level of consensus for 
themselves (e.g., by reading original journal articles or interviewing individual 
                                                 
1 Schum additionally recognises the distinction between untruthful bias (‘veracity’) and 
‘truthful’ bias (‘objectivity’). Essentially, a source low in objectivity might report what 
they genuinely believe to be the true state of the world, but this belief has been influenced 
by their own bias, whilst low veracity represents a deliberate attempt to deceive.   
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scientists). As an illustration, throughout this manuscript we quote figures of scientific 
consensus. For you, the reader, therefore, not only is the credibility of the individual 
scientists within the consensus important, but also our credibility as accurate purveyors 
of information. In fact, as can be seen from citations accompanying the three examples 
at the outset of this article, we have not experienced the consensus levels ourselves, and 
consequently the credibility of Cook et al. (2013), Green (2016) and Whelton et al. 
(2002) become relevant. Figure 1 shows a Bayesian Network demonstrating the 
complexity of the inferences that must be made. In this network, the expertise and 
trustworthiness of the individual scientists are not represented explicitly due to space 
constraints, but they can be captured in the probabilistic relationships (the arrows) 
linking the true fact about ACC with what is reported by each expert (for an 
introduction to Bayesian Networks, see e.g., Korb & Nicholson, 2003; Pearl, 1988; on 
their application in this particular context see Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Hahn et al., 
2016; for other examples see e.g., Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013; Harris et al., 2016; 
Jern et al., 2014; Kadane & Schum, 1996; Lagnado, 2011; Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 
2013). Figure 1 demonstrates that the report of expert consensus on the topic of ACC 
presented at the outset of this article is ‘third hand.’ In addition to the potential for error 
(or bias) in the reports of each of the individual scientists (Experts 1-5), a reader might 
perceive Cook et al. as having a particular ideological bias2, or Harris et al. (present 
paper) as too incompetent to accurately report on the report of Cook et al. All these 
factors are relevant to the question of how persuaded a reader should be by the scientific 
consensus presented at the outset of this article. 
                                                 
2 Indeed, some potential readers (e.g., Legates, Soon, Briggs, Monckton of Brenchley, 2015) 
have perceived Cook et al. as having such a bias.  
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Following Hahn et al. (2016), in the present empirical work, we consider source 
credibility as it pertains to the reporter of the consensus (e.g., Cook et al. in Figure 1). 
Furthermore, although the two different components of source credibility 
(trustworthiness and expertise) appear conceptually important and have been 
demonstrated to be necessary to fully capture use of testimony (e.g., in children, Shafto 
et al., 2012), in the current paper we simplify the concept of source credibility and 
consider it as a single factor. Practically, it is however important to recognise that 
complete trust in the honesty (veracity) of a communicator, does not mean that they 
have not made honest mistakes (sensitivity). 
Lessons from decision making 
Having considered the formal question of what factors should influence the 
convincingness of a communication of expert consensus, we now turn to consider a 
potential lesson from descriptive research into decision making. Scholars of decision 
making have spent a considerable amount of research time and resources attempting to 
understand how people evaluate prospects such as ‘A 90% chance of winning £10, 
otherwise nothing.’ Indeed, gambles such as these have been deemed the ‘fruit fly’ of 
decision research (Lopes, 1983; see also Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic, & Starmer, 
2007; Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, & Hertwig, in press).  
Research investigating evaluations of gambles like the one above has 
demonstrated that people’s valuations (measured directly and through choice 
paradigms) are well described by two functions which are non-linear transformations of 
the probability described in the gamble (i.e., 90%) and the value described in the 
gamble (i.e., £10) (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; see 
e.g., Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2013, for a review). Specifically, and of central interest 
for the current paper, people’s decision making proceeds as though they underweight 
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high (though less than certain) probabilities, and overweight low probabilities (see also, 
e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). In the light of these findings, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
communication of high levels of scientific consensus has not had as much of an 
influence as might be hoped on people’s overall perceptions of the consensus or 
decisions to engage in more sustainable behaviour. The 97% communicated in a 
statement such as the one at the start of this article is likely to be underweighted by 
recipients of the communication. Correspondingly, the 3% who (implicitly) are 
suggested not to agree with the consensus will be overweighted. More recent research 
into decisions from experience suggests a way in which the influence of the high 
consensus might be enhanced. 
  Barron and Erev (2003) shook up decision making research with their 
demonstration that a number of well-established and robust decision making 
phenomena did not hold (indeed, mostly were reversed) when the presentation of the 
gambles was altered. Specifically, rather than having the parameters of a given gamble 
described to  them (e.g., “90% chance of winning £10, otherwise nothing”), participants 
learn the structure of the gamble through experience. For example, the gamble 
described above might be recreated by asking the participant to press a button multiple 
times (e.g., 100, 200, 400 times in the different experiments reported in Barron & Erev). 
On 90% of occasions, the button would yield £10, whilst on 10% of occasions it would 
yield nothing. Typically, in decisions from experience, participants would be required to 
choose between different buttons, with different payoffs. 
The critical finding for the present paper is that when outcomes are experienced 
rather than described, the best fitting function capturing the influence of probability on 
decisions has the opposite properties to that observed for described outcomes. Namely, 
low probabilities are now underweighted and high probabilities are overweighted (e.g., 
Barron & Erev, 2003; Camilleri & Newell, 2011a; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hau, Pleskac, & 
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Hertwig, 2010; Hau, Pleskac, Keifer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & 
Erev, 2004; Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009; for 
an reviews see Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Wulff et al., in press). Although there are 
arguments that this so-called decision-experience ‘gap’ arises primarily from an 
underexperience of the rare outcome, either in the whole, or in recently experienced 
samples (Camilleri & Newell, 2011b; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Rakow et al., 2008; see also 
Jarvstad, Hahn, Rushton, & Warren, 2013), the descriptive phenomenon remains. 
Typically, when gambles are experienced rather than described, people make choices as 
though they overweight high probabilities and underweight low probabilities. Thus, if 
we wish to maximise the influence of high scientific consensuses on people’s 
subsequent decisions (e.g., regarding sustainable behaviour), the decision making 
literature suggests that presenting people with the consensus in an experiential format 
will be more effective than merely describing it to them.  
How might we improve the communication of scientific consensus?   
In our experiments we focus on the importance of source credibility and the format of 
consensus communication. The literature reviewed above provides two clear 
suggestions for improving consensus communications: 1) Present the information from 
a reputable (trustworthy and expert) source; 2) Have people experience the consensus, 
rather than merely describing it to them. It is worth noting that the latter suggestion 
stems both from the lessons learnt from decision making research and from formal work 
on source credibility. In the case of the latter, pure experience of the scientists’ 
consensus (i.e., personal interviews with all the scientists), removes two ‘layers’ from 
Figure 1 (‘Cook et al.’ and ‘Harris et al.’). Consequently, there are fewer, potentially 
fallible, steps between the level of consensus of the scientists (zero – this is experienced 
directly) and the objective truth about ACC (one). Thus, we predict that the effect of a 
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communication of expert consensus will be greater the more trustworthy and expert the 
source describing the consensus is, but it will be greatest where participants experience 
the consensus.  
In the following, we present two experiments to test these predictions, noting 
that the manipulation of experience is somewhat impoverished. Nevertheless, we hope 
that these experiments will encourage future researchers to further test the effectiveness 
of experiencing expert consensus, given the strong theoretical support for its 
effectiveness.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
After excluding four incomplete entries, 161 British nationals (75 female, 1 preferred 
not to say; aged 18-61 [median = 33]) were recruited through the online crowdsourcing 
platform Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). The participants were each paid £0.60. 
Ethical approval for both experiments in this paper was granted from the Departmental 
Ethics Chair for Speech, Hearing and Phonetic Sciences (University College London).  
Design 
Participants were presented with three out of nine possible communications, each one 
presenting consensus information about one of three topics. The first independent 
variable was Topic – participants were presented with consensus information on each of 
following three topics: climate change, politics (Brexit) and medicine. The second 
independent variable was Format – consensus information pertinent to the relevant 
topic was presented either by a reliable source or an unreliable source, or ‘experienced.’ 
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Each participant saw one (different) format for each topic, and each topic was presented 
only once.  
The dependent variables were estimates of consensus levels (perceived 
consensus [out of 100]) and beliefs about the claims towards a topic, measured on a 5-
point scale from “strongly disagree” [1] to “strongly agree” [5]. These were collected 
both before (prior) and after (posterior) participants received consensus information 
about each of the three topics. 
Materials 
Across all three communication formats (Experience, Reliable source and Unreliable 
source), the statements that experts agreed with were identical. For climate change, the 
relevant statement was ‘Humans are causing global warming’; for the political topic, it 
was ‘Leaving the European Union and the single market (Brexit) would be bad for the 
UK economy’; for the medical topic it was ‘Regular aerobic exercise lowers blood 
pressure.’ 
The level of consensus presented within each topic was taken from an existing 
reputable source, with external validity prioritised over the internal validity associated 
with keeping the level of consensus communicated constant. For climate change, Cook 
et al.’s (2013) figure of 97% of climate scientists agreeing that humans are causing 
global warming was used; for the political topic (Brexit), the Ipsos MORI (2016) survey 
figure of 88% of economists agreeing that leaving the EU would be bad for the UK 
economy was used; and for the medical topic, Whelton et al.’s (2002) figure of 84% of 
medical scientists agreeing that regular aerobic exercise lowers diastolic blood pressure 
was used (the technical term ‘diastolic’ was not included in the experiment). 
In the Experience condition, participants were presented with ten sets of ten 
fictional experts’ silhouettes, each expert either agreeing or disagreeing with one of the 
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three aforementioned statements. The level of agreement/disagreement was identical to 
the consensus reported by the reliable and unreliable sources. Although the order of the 
silhouettes within each set was fixed, their initial order had been randomised, and the 
order in which the ten sets were displayed was also randomised. To personify the 
fictional experts, they were each identified with pseudo-random initials (such that there 
were not a high number of uncommon initials; see Figure 2 for an example set from the 
climate change condition).  
As the reliable sources, fictional anonymous professors of renowned UK 
universities (Oxford, Cambridge, LSE) were presented. For example, a participant 
presented with a reliable medical source would have read the following: 
 
Carefully consider the following report: 
‘84% of medical scientists agree that aerobic exercise lowers blood pressure.’ 
Source: Review by a professor of Medical Sciences, University of Cambridge 
 
To determine the unreliable sources, a pilot study was run via Prolific 
Academic. For each of the three topics, 40 participants were presented with the 
appropriate aforementioned consensus information, and presented with a list of nine 
sources expected to vary in perceived trustworthiness and expertise. Participants were 
asked to rate the sources’ trustworthiness and expertise on a scale of 0-100. The 
following unreliable sources were subsequently chosen for the main experiment: a 
political columnist in a politically left-leaning publication for climate change; a political 
columnist in a politically right-leaning publication for Brexit; and a medical columnist 
in a politically right-leaning publication for the medical topic. For each of these three 
sources, the balance of bias (i.e. lack of trustworthiness) and expertise was the same, 
namely they were all rated as more untrustworthy than they were unknowledgeable. 
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Although for the climate change topic, a political columnist in a politically right-leaning 
publication was, similarly to the Brexit topic, rated as being the least trustworthy, we 
chose the left-leaning columnist instead. Because it is generally politically right-leaning 
individuals who deny climate change (e.g., Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2011), a left-leaning columnist might be perceived as more likely 
to advance ‘left-wing propaganda’ advocating the reality of ACC. 
Before being presented with any consensus information, participants completed 
a prior beliefs and attitudes questionnaire assessing: a) their beliefs about the claims 
relevant to the consensus information (such as “Humans are causing global warming” 
for the climate change topic, requiring an answer ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree); b) how many experts out of every 100 they believed agreed with these 
same statements; c) to what degree they agreed with the statement “I am in favour of 
Britain leaving the European Union”; d) five questions about support for the free-
market system (Heath & Gifford, 2006). These latter questions required the participant 
to indicate their belief in the free market system on a 5-point scale from ‘strongly 
disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Following Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac (2013), 
one question (‘I support the free-market system but not at the expense of environmental 
quality’) was left out, the authors finding that this question loaded on a second factor by 
itself. Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Vaughan (2013), and Cook and Lewandowsky 
(2016; see also van der Linden, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, in press) found that the effect 
of free market ideology on climate change scepticism was almost eliminated when 
providing Australian participants with ‘socially-normative’ information about the 
scientific consensus on climate change. For U.S.-based participants, however, the 
difference between free-market supporters and free-market opponents in climate change 
skepticism was enhanced by a consensus communication (Cook & Lewandowsky, 
2016; but see van der Linden et al., 2015, for opposite results with party political 
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affiliation, rather than free market beliefs). Free market beliefs (FMBs) were thus 
assessed to check for the robustness of the effects of displaying consensus information 
to participants. We additionally assessed attitudes towards Britain leaving the European 
Union to determine the scope of influence of the consensus communication. 
Procedure 
The experiment was run through the online data collection platform Qualtrics.com. 
After receiving instructions and giving consent to participate, participants completed the 
prior beliefs and attitudes questionnaire. Next, they were presented with consensus 
information on all three topics. After each presentation of consensus information, 
participants were asked to provide some demographic data before being asked to again 
indicate their beliefs about statements relevant to the consensus information just 
presented (the questions were identical to the first two questions in the prior beliefs and 
attitudes questionnaire outlined above). Finally, after proceeding through these 
questions for all three topics, the participants were again asked to indicate their 
agreement with the statement “I am in favour of Britain leaving the European Union”. 
Results 
In both Experiments 1 and 2, we analyse perceived consensus levels separately from 
beliefs about the claims. For each dependent variable, we use a linear mixed effects 
analysis as an alternative to a repeated-measures ANOVA, which would have been 
inappropriate as every participant did not complete every combination of Format and 
Topic. The models includes fixed effects for Format, Topic, and Prior/Posterior, as well 
as all two-way and three-way interactions. To account for the repeated-measures, the 
models included participant-specific random intercepts. All models were estimated with 
the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2016) for the R software 
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environment (R Core Team, 2017), and test results are based on the Satterthwaite 
approximation to the degrees of freedom, obtained with the R package lmerTest 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). 
Perceived consensus levels 
The linear mixed-effects model yielded no effects of, nor interactions involving, 
Format. Of most relevance, the Format x Prior/Posterior interaction was not significant, 
F(2, 784.20) = 1.10, p = .34. Figure 3 shows mean estimates of the consensus across the 
three topics. The first thing to note is that, whilst participants initially underestimated 
the level of consensus for Climate Change and Brexit, this was less apparent for the 
Medical topic. Subsequently, there was less of an increase in estimated levels of 
consensus for the Medical topic, as confirmed by a Topic x Prior/Posterior interaction, 
F(2, 784.20) = 19.19, p < .001. Despite this, there was still an overall main effect of the 
consensus communication (Prior/Posterior), F(1, 784.72) = 65.25, p < .001. Other than 
the unsurprising main effect of Topic, F(2, 784.27) = 37.73, p < .001, no other 
significant effects were observed (all Fs < 1). 
Beliefs about the claims 
Given the lack of effects on perceived consensus levels, it would be surprising to 
observe an effect on people’s beliefs about the claims. Inspection of Figure 4 indeed 
suggests, once again, that there is no effect of communication format in these data. A 
linear mixed-effects model confirmed this, yielding no effects of, nor interactions 
involving, Format. Again, critically, the Format x Prior/Posterior interaction was not 
significant (F < 1). Aside from main effects of Prior/Posterior, F(1, 786.85) = 11.70, p < 
.001, and Topic, F(2, 786.52) = 35.92, p < .001, there were no other significant effects 
(all ps > .16). 
Experiencing consensus communications  17 
 
There was a significant interaction between FMBs (mean support was 2.5 [1-5 
scale]) and Prior/Posterior in predicting beliefs about ACC, Beta = 0.12, p = .04. There 
was a significant relationship between beliefs about ACC and FMB before receiving the 
consensus communication, r(159) = -.32, p < .001, but not afterwards, r(159) = -.12, p = 
.13. These results are in line with those observed in Lewandowsky, Gignac and 
Vaughan (2013), van der Linden et al. (in press), and Cook and Lewandowsky’s (2016) 
Australian participants, and counter to those in the latter’s U.S. participants.  
Nineteen of the 157 respondents who reported their attitude to Brexit both 
before and after the consensus communications provided different ratings at the two 
time points. Fourteen of these became less favourable towards Brexit, whilst 5 became 
more favourable.  
Discussion     
 The results of Experiment 1 were somewhat disappointing. Despite the clear theoretical 
justification for the predictions that the Format manipulation would affect the 
persuasiveness of the consensus communication, there was no evidence to support this. 
The effect of the consensus communication (main effect of Prior/Posterior) on 
participants’ reported beliefs about the claims presented replicates other findings in the 
literature (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der Linden et al., 2014). 
Communicating information about actual levels of scientific consensus influences both 
perceptions of that consensus, as well as beliefs about the claims about which there is a 
consensus. 
Despite the lack of support obtained in Experiment 1 for the main prediction that 
communication format would influence perceptions of scientific consensus levels, and 
associated beliefs, the basic design of the experiment was repeated in Experiment 2. 
Whilst Experiment 1 recruited UK participants via Prolific Academic, Experiment 2 
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recruited U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Whilst about 90% of people 
in the UK believe that climate change is happening (Capstick, Demski, Sposato, 
Pidgeon, Spence, & Corner, 2015), the number in the US is only about 70% 
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, & Rosenthal, 2014). We thus 
anticipated greater variance in prior beliefs about ACC in this sample, potentially 
increasing the power of our manipulation. In addition, we (nearly) doubled the sample 
size. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Excluding two participants who reported problems viewing the silhouettes in the 
Experience condition, 300 U.S. nationals completed the experiment (103 females, 197 
males; aged 18-65 [median = 31]). They were recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and each paid $0.50. 
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were, for the most part, identical to Experiment 1. Due to 
the Brexit vote being in the past by the time Experiment 2 was conducted, and the U.S. 
population perhaps not being overly involved or interested in the issue in the first place, 
the politics topic was changed to the issue of whether ‘undocumented immigrants 
currently living in the US should have a way to legally stay in the US, if certain legal 
requirements, for example the application for citizenship or permanent residence, are 
met’. The relevant consensus statistic (72% of Americans agree with the statement) was 
taken from the Pew Research Center (2015) survey. Due to this consensus representing 
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the opinions of regular Americans, the 72% here represents social consensus rather than 
expert consensus. The political topic was therefore of less primary research interest, and 
mainly served to provide a third level of Topic to facilitate the presentation of three 
levels of Format. The questions about the participants’ Brexit voting intentions were 
also removed. 
Secondly, because in Experiment 1 the participants’ prior consensus belief 
ratings for the medical topic were on average higher than the reported ‘correct’ 
consensus statistic, this number was raised from the previous 84% to 96% in 
Experiment 2, in order that prior consensus beliefs were mostly lower than the reported 
statistics, facilitating more meaningful comparisons between the climate change and 
medical topics. Participants were notified of this change in the debrief. 
Finally, the university for all the reliable sources was changed to Harvard 
University to ensure relevance for U.S. participants. 
Results 
Perceived consensus levels 
In the linear mixed-effects analysis, the critical Format x Prior/Posterior interaction was 
significant, F(2, 1483.71) = 6.58, p < .001. Figure 5 shows mean estimates of the 
consensus across the three topics. In each of the three topics, the greatest difference 
between prior and posterior estimates was in the Experience condition, as predicted. 
This is confirmed by the individual contrasts comprising the interaction, which show 
that the Prior/Posterior effect was greater in the Experience condition versus the 
Reliable and Unreliable conditions, t(1483.70) = 3.63, p < .001, whilst there was no 
significant difference in the Prior/Posterior effect between the Reliable and Unreliable 
conditions, t(1483.70) = 0.14, p = .89. In addition, the Format x Prior/Posterior 
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interaction was not moderated by Topic, F(4, 1483.71) = 1.30, p = .27. Once again, 
overall, there was a significant main effect of the consensus communication 
(Prior/Posterior), F(1, 1483.84) = 865.22, p < .001, as well as uninteresting effects of 
Topic, F(2, 1483.84) = 865.22, p < .001, and a Topic x Prior/Posterior interaction, F(2, 
1483.72) = 12.51, p < .001. 
Beliefs about the claims 
Having observed an effect of communication format on perceived consensus levels, a 
downstream effect might also be observed on people’s beliefs about the claims. Figure 6 
shows that, numerically, the pattern of results is in the predicted direction, with the 
greatest change in belief observed in the Experience condition across all three topics. 
There was no evidence, however, that this was a reliable result, with the Format x 
Prior/Posterior interaction non-significant, F(2, 1484.07) = 1.54, p = .21. The only 
significant effects were the main effects of Prior/Posterior, F(1, 1484.07) = 19.99, p < 
.001, and Topic, F(2, 1484.17) = 161.31, p < .001. No other significant effects were 
observed (all ps > .13).  
In Experiment 2, beliefs about ACC were not predicted by an interaction 
between FMB (mean support 2.6/5) and Prior/Posterior, Beta = 0.03, p = .37, but FMB 
did predict beliefs both before, r(298) = -.58, p < .001, and after, r(298) = -.54, p < .001, 
consensus communications. 
Discussion 
Once again, an overall effect of consensus communication on reported beliefs was 
observed. Of more relevance to the current paper, and more encouragingly than 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 showed the greatest change in perceived consensus levels 
was brought about in the Experience condition. This provides the first direct evidence 
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that such a presentation might be beneficial in expert consensus communications. That 
the effect did not filter through to influence reported beliefs about the claims presented, 
despite an effect of consensus communication on said beliefs, might be a result of the 
small effect size on perceived consensus levels, which was not able to influence 
responses on a 5-point response scale.   
General Discussion 
We have set out conditions that we expect to facilitate the communication of expert 
consensus information, specifically highlighting the role of ‘experiential’ 
communications from reliable experts. Two experiments provide mixed support for the 
prediction that such communications will lead to greater change in perceived consensus 
levels and related beliefs. Experiment 1 provided no support for the prediction in a UK 
sample, whilst Experiment 2 (U.S. sample) observed a small, but reliable, effect on 
perceived consensus levels, but no effect on beliefs about the statements being made.  
There are a number of possible reasons for the mixed support for our 
hypotheses, and space constraints prevent us from considering them all here. Of course, 
the first is that the hypotheses were wrong. Given the justification for the hypotheses 
from different areas of psychology, however, we are reluctant to arrive at that 
conclusion too swiftly. We believe that a search for appropriate means for conveying 
consensus information ‘experientially’ is a fruitful one. We therefore primarily focus on 
two alternative, non-exclusive, reasons for the mixed nature of our data. One is that our 
operationalisation of ‘experience’ was insufficient. The other relates to the potential for 
ceiling effects.  
Support for the potential for ceiling effects operating in these data is evident 
from a comparison of the two experiments, focussing on the climate change scenario, 
since all elements of that scenario were common across the two experiments. In both 
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experiments, participants were informed that the scientific consensus was 97%. 
Averaging across all experimental conditions, participants’ prior estimates of consensus 
were 80% in Experiment 1 and 79% in Experiment 23. Thus, the potential for updating 
beliefs is the same across experiments. The U.S. participants in Experiment 2 typically 
updated their estimates less on receipt of the consensus communication. If one uses the 
Unreliable condition as a benchmark (since this was the condition in which we expected 
participants to update least), U.S. participants in Experiment 2, on average, only revised 
their consensus estimates to 83%, whilst U.K. participants in Experiment 1 revised their 
estimates to 92%. The difference between 92% and 97% leaves little room for the other 
Format conditions to exert additional influence, which provides a parsimonious 
explanation for why an effect was observed in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 14. 
Similarly, even in the U.S., mean ratings of belief in human caused climate change were 
4.1 (out of 5) at the start of the experiment, and 4.3 after receiving an Unreliable 
consensus communication. Thus, once more, the skew of responses towards the top of 
the scale likely contributed to the lack of an effect on belief ratings. 
Ceiling effects might therefore have compromised the power of the experiments 
presented. This is, however, something of a conjecture, and future research should seek 
to test the influence of experience in consensus communications using messages where: 
                                                 
3 These estimates are higher than usually observed; we did not recruit nationally representative 
samples.  
4 Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) noted different responses of Australian and U.S. participants 
to consensus communications, especially noting that U.S. (but not Australian) free market 
endorsers showed reduced trust in scientists following a consensus communication. Whilst 
we argue that ceiling effects offer a parsimonious account for the differences observed 
between our Experiments 1 and 2, we cannot rule out alternative cultural explanations. 
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a) participants greatly underestimate the expert consensus; and b) a standard consensus 
communication results in new estimates that are still considerably below the actual 
expert consensus. We suggest that a critical aim of such studies should be to identify 
most effective methods for an ‘experiential’ communication of expert consensus. The 
‘experience’ in the current experiments was minimal, and yet we observed some support 
for our hypothesis that this will lead to greater belief updating in terms of consensus 
estimates. Future studies should seek to identify an optimum compromise between a 
practical communication and the amount of information provided about the individual 
experts providing the consensus. The ’97 hours’ project 
(https://skepticalscience.com/nsh/#) presents 100 characters on the screen. The user can 
click on any character to reveal the individual the cartoon is representing, their expert 
credentials, and a quote. Subsequent research could measure the influence of 
presentations such as this.  
We hypothesised a benefit of an ‘experiential’ communication based on 
considerations of source credibility, and from observations in the decision making 
literature. It is also true, however, that the Experience condition required participants to 
spend more time thinking about the expert consensus. Whilst this could be seen as a 
confound, we see it as an integral part of experience. Experience will typically require 
more time and effort than simple testimony (running the experiments and analysing the 
data oneself – ultimate experience – would take longer still!). We are non-committal on 
the precise psychological mechanisms that could underlie the benefits of the Experience 
condition. As specified in the Introduction, the decisions from experience literature 
suggests a few contributing mechanisms (for reviews see Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Wulff 
et al., in press; see also Hills & Hertwig, 2010; Jarvstad et al., 2013), in addition to the 
potential for fundamentally different decision processes being involved (Hau et al., 
2008; Hills & Hertwig, 2010). Amount of time and attention (in addition to formal 
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considerations of source expertise) are potentially additional contributing factors. 
Indeed, the fact that there are many factors that could generate such an advantage, to us 
makes it all the more important that the potential for such a benefit is fully explored. 
Conclusion 
Expert consensus is fundamental to the continual development of society and 
technological advancement. In some domains, especially those with political 
considerations, public support is required for necessary policy changes in light of expert 
consensus. Consequently, how information about expert consensus is best 
communicated is an important applied question. From the literatures on source 
credibility and decision making, we suggested that the potential to experience high 
levels of expert consensus would be more effective than a simple numerical description 
of that consensus. We observed some support for such a prediction in one of two 
experiments testing this prediction. We argue that the mixed nature of these results 
potentially stems from ceiling effects. Given the strong theoretical justification for the 
predictions, we encourage future researchers to seek to identify optimum methods for 
presenting consensus information ‘experientially.’ 
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Figure 1. The testimonial ‘steps’ in the report at the outset of this article that 
“97% of climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming.” (The 5 
scientists are illustrative and kept to 5 solely due to space constraints). 
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Figure 2. Climate scientists’ silhouettes in the Experience condition (see the 
online version for a color version). 
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Figure 3. Prior and posterior estimates of the expert consensus across the 3 
communication formats for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) 
topics in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Prior and posterior beliefs about the claims made in the consensus statements 
for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) topics in Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5. Prior and posterior estimates of the expert consensus across the 3 
communication formats for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) 
topics in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6. Prior and posterior beliefs about the claims made in the consensus statements 
for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) topics in Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. The testimonial ‘steps’ in the report at the outset of this article that “97% of 
climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming.” (The 5 scientists are 
illustrative and kept to 5 solely due to space constraints). 
 
Figure 2. Climate scientists’ silhouettes in the Experience condition (see the online 
version for a color version). 
 
Figure 3. Prior and posterior estimates of the expert consensus across the 3 
communication formats for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) 
topics in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 4. Prior and posterior beliefs about the claims made in the consensus statements 
for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) topics in Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 5. Prior and posterior estimates of the expert consensus across the 3 
communication formats for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) 
topics in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 6. Prior and posterior beliefs about the claims made in the consensus statements 
for the Climate (top), Political (middle) and Medical (bottom) topics in Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
